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"Inevitable Inequities:"' The Public Duty Doctrine and Sovereign
Immunity in North Carolina
INTRODUCTION
On January 30, 2005, a young mother and her son made their way
down a meandering country road in rural North Carolina on their way
to church. Accompanying them were two sisters, a six-year-old and a
ten-year-old, who were friends of the family. A few miles from church,
the right front tire of the compact car in which the group rode dropped
off into a washout which had, over time, eroded its way into the asphalt
driving surface. Apparently, the Department of Transportation had
failed to both inspect and repair the washout as mandated by statute.2
The washout was deep enough to cause the underside of the car to
slam into the road, robbing the driver of the ability to control the vehi-
cle. As she struggled to regain control of the car, it careened back into
the road and into the path of an oncoming SUV. Three-year-old Austin
Partida lost his life that day, as well as six-year old Heather Brown.3
Fortunately, under the North Carolina Court of Appeals's current rule
regarding the application of the public duty doctrine, a claim against
the North Carolina Department of Transportation for failure to prop-
erly inspect and repair the highway, in this scenario, would not be
barred.4
Now consider the following incident. A food processing plant in
rural North Carolina had been in operation for almost a dozen years.6
Not once in more than a decade had a North Carolina Department of
Labor official set foot on the premises in order to inspect it for ade-
quate fire exits as the department is charged by law to do.7 As a result,
the employer had either obstructed or failed to provide these exits.8
One fateful day, a fire in the plant took the lives of twenty-five employ-
1. Braswell v. Braswell, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (N.C. 1991).
2. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-346 (2005).
3. This comment is dedicated to Amanda Partida James in memory of Austin
Partida and Heather Brown.
4. See Myers v. McGrady, 613 S.E.2d 334 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005), disc. rev. allowed,
619 S.E.2d 510 (N.C. 2005).
5. This scenario is based on the case of Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 495 S.E.2d
711 (N.C. 1998).
6. Id. at 713.
7. Id. at 713-14.
8. Id.
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ees who were not able to escape the flames.9 In stark contrast to the
first scenario, the court held in this case that a claim could not stand
against the department because it was barred by the public duty doc-
trine.10 If you find these two results difficult to reconcile you are not
alone. The courts' application of the public duty doctrine in North
Carolina produces inconsistent and unjustifiable results, as it has in
other states.11
Since the public duty doctrine first arrived on the scene in South
v. Maryland ex rel. Pottle,'2 it has been the object of much derision and
a constant source of confusion for attorneys and, apparently, judges as
well. 13 The doctrine is a common law construction that serves to bar
claims against the government.' 4 Initially, it only applied to cases
involving local law enforcement. 15 The public duty doctrine simply
states that when a governmental entity owes a duty to the public in
general, it owes no duty at all to specific individuals.' 6 This, in effect,
eviscerates one of the essential elements of a negligence claim, the exis-
tence of a duty owed to the plaintiff.' 7 Without this duty the plaintiff's
claim is dead on arrival. The doctrine is often applied in North Caro-
lina to claims brought under the authority of the North Carolina Tort
9. Twenty-five people died and fifty-six were injured in the inferno. Charles D.
ThompsonJr., Editorial, Honoring Hamlet, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Feb. 29, 2000 at
A1O.
10. Stone, 495 S.E.2d 711.
11. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State, 656
P.2d 597, 599 (Ariz. 1982); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159 (Colo. 1986);
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla. 1979);
Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 671 (Iowa 1986); Jean W. v. Commonwealth,
610 N.E.2d 305, 308 (Mass. 1993); Maple v. City of Omaha, 384 N.W.2d 254, 257
(Neb. 1986); Schear v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 687 P.2d 728, 730-31 (N.M. 1984); Brennen v.
City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 724-25 (Or. 1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 247
N.W.2d 132, 139 (Wis. 1976).
12. 59 U.S. 396 (1855).
13. Leake, 720 P.2d at 159 (holding the public duty doctrine "created needless
confusion in the law and resulted in uneven and inequitable results"); Anita Brown-
Graham, Local Governments and the Public Duty Doctrine After Wood v. Guilford, 81
N.C. L. REV. 2291, 2292 (2003) ("[Tihe North Carolina courts' application of the
public duty doctrine stands out as problematic.").
14. Coleman v. Cooper, 366 S.E.2d 2, 6 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
15. Braswell v. Braswell, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (N.C. 1991).
16. Suzanne M. Dardis, Note, Gleason v. Peters: An Application of the Public Duty
Rule as a Judicial Resurrection of Sovereign Immunity, 43 S.D. L. REV. 706, 707 (1998).
17. Brown-Graham, supra note 13, at 2294 (arguing the public duty doctrine does
not contravene the will of the legislature).
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Claims Act against state agencies' 8 and to claims brought against local
governments under statutes that allow municipalities and counties to
purchase liability insurance.' 9 Together these statutes amount to a
statutory waiver of the state's sovereign immunity.2 ° When applied to
such cases, the effect of the doctrine is to reinstate the sovereign immu-
nity that the state legislature has explicitly waived.2 In addition, the
North Carolina courts' decisions concerning when and when not to
apply the public duty doctrine to bar claims against the state have been
arbitrary and are founded upon trivial factual distinctions that do not
justify divergent results in cases that are principally the same.
This comment first examines the muddled past of the application
of the public duty doctrine by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court of North Carolina with the aim of showing that it is unworkable,
confusing, and unjust. Second, it suggests the Supreme Court of
North Carolina should completely abrogate the public duty doctrine in
deference to the legislature's intent to waive sovereign immunity to the
extent it has done so in the Tort Claims Act.22 Finally, in its stead, an
alternative approach is offered. The North Carolina Supreme Court
should adopt a traditional negligence standard of reasonable care
under the circumstances, modified to recognize the peculiar chal-
lenges faced by governments due to the limited resources at their dis-
posal and the discretionary decisions they are called upon to make.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Doctrine's Genesis
Early common law in England, and subsequently in America, pro-
vided the sovereign could not be held civilly liable for a breach of duty
owed to individual citizens. As Justice Holmes stated, "there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends. ' 23 Although the doctrine lacked any real philosophical
18. See, e.g., Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 495 S.E.2d 711, 714 (N.C. 1998); Hunt
v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 499 S.E.2d 747 (N.C. 1998).
19. See, e.g., Sinning v. Clark, 459 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
20. Gammons v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 472 S.E.2d 722, 723-24 (N.C. 1996).
Sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine that immunizes governmental entities
from civil suits by private citizens. The doctrine is best described by the famous
maxim, "the king can do no wrong." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984).
21. Stone, 495 S.E.2d at 719 (Orr, J., dissenting).
22. Dardis, supra note 16, at 707.
23. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
20061 273
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justification, it quickly took root in American jurisprudence and has
remained relatively unchallenged.24
Just as the sovereign makes the law on which the right to recourse
depends, it may also willingly waive its immunity by legislative acts.
2 5
The United States government and the majority of states have passed
such legislation, allowing citizens to bring suits for damages resulting
from actions or inactions of government agents so long as they are not
discretionary or policy decisions.26 However, where an attempted
waiver of governmental immunity exists, the public duty doctrine is
sure to arise. With the advent of statutes abrogating sovereign immu-
nity came the judicial application of the public duty doctrine.27
North Carolina passed the Tort Claims Act in 1951, vesting in the
Industrial Commission the power to act as "a court for the purpose of
hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of Educa-
tion, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, institu-
tions and agencies of the State. ''28 This legislation amounted to a
partial waiver of the state's sovereign immunity.2 9 Although sovereign
immunity still protects many local governments, "[i]t is subject ... to
certain legislatively created exceptions allowing local governments to
purchase liability insurance to protect the public."3 Under these stat-
utes, the purchase of insurance operates as a waiver of the local gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity up to the amount of insurance
acquired. 31 This remained the status quo until 1991 when the North
Carolina Supreme Court first utilized the public duty doctrine to
shield the government from liability in the case of Braswell v. Bras-
well.32 Though it was not a Tort Claims Act case, it signaled the begin-
ning of a trend in North Carolina of reinstituting, judicially, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity under an assumed name.
24. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET. AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 371 (6th ed. 2003).
25. KEETON ET AL., supra note 20.
26. Id.
27. Frank Swindell, Note, Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspections in Sinning v.
Clark - A "Hollow" Victory for the Public Duty Doctrine, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 241, 248-
49 (1996).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (2005).
29. Zimmer v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 360 S.E.2d 115, 117 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
30. Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 526 S.E.2d 652, 654 (N.C. 2000).
31. N.C. GEN STAT. § 160A-485(a) (2005) (referring to cities); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 153A-435(a) (2005) (referring to counties).
32. Myers v. McGrady, 613 S.E.2d 334, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Braswell v.
Braswell, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (N.C. 1991)), disc. rev. allowed, 619 S.E.2d 510 (N.C.
2005).
[Vol. 28:271
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In Braswell, the son of a woman killed by her husband brought
suit against his father and against the county sheriff for negligence in
failing to protect his mother.33 The sheriff in this case was aware the
husband, who happened to be one of the sheriffs deputies, had
threatened to kill his wife as well as himself.34 Consequently, the sher-
iff had assured her "that his men would be keeping an eye on her" and
that "he would see she got back and forth to work safely .... "3 That
day Mrs. Braswell died at the hands of her husband.36 Despite the
sheriffs knowledge of the threat and his failure to take steps to allevi-
ate a volatile situation, the supreme court held the claim against the
sheriff was barred based on the public duty doctrine.37 The court
reasoned:
The general common law rule, known as the public duty doctrine, is
that a municipality and its agents act for the benefit of the public, and
therefore, there is no liability for the failure to furnish police protection
to specific individuals. This rule recognizes the limited resources of law
enforcement and refuses to judicially impose an overwhelming burden
of liability for failure to prevent every criminal act.38
This rule made no provision for situations where an official's deci-
sions about how to appropriate resources were in no way connected to
limitations on those resources. Even if the official's acts or omissions
were completely unjustified and unrelated to limitations on its availa-
ble resources, the government would still be shielded by a rule that is
premised upon resource limitations that may or may not actually exist.
The court in Braswell, not willing for the rule to be overly simplistic
and recognizing the harsh results this rule was bound to generate,
offered two exceptions to the general rule that the public duty doctrine
always applies to local law enforcement. The court noted that "to pre-
vent inevitable inequities to certain individuals" 39 the public duty doc-
trine would not apply 1) where there is a "special relationship"
between the injured and the defendant, 40 and 2) when the defendant
"creates a special duty by promising protection to an individual, the
protection is not forthcoming, and the individual's reliance on the
promise of protection is causally related to the injury suffered."4'
33. Braswell v. Braswell, 410 S.E.2d 897, 899 (N.C. 1991).
34. Id. at 900.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 901.
37. Id. at 902.
38. Id. at 901 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 902.
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting Coleman v. Cooper, 366 S.E.2d 2, 6 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)).
20061 275
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At this point in the doctrine's evolutionary trek through the North
Carolina courts, it seemed the public duty doctrine would be applied
only to cases involving local law enforcement,4 2 and the doctrine
would always be applied to such cases unless one of the two enumer-
ated exceptions existed.4 3 Though the rule sounded narrow enough, it
would prove itself very expansive as the court worked to stretch it fur-
ther than its original language would allow.
B. The Tort Claims Act: The Flood Gates Open
The next step in the evolution of this doctrine came in Stone v.
North Carolina Department of Labor44 and Hunt v. North Carolina
Department of Labor.45 In Stone, the owner of a food products plant
had failed to provide unobstructed and adequate fire exits, and work-
ers, as a consequence, were unable to escape the plant during a fire. 46
The decedents' estates and those injured sued the Department of
Labor under the Tort Claims Act alleging it negligently failed to inspect
the facility for adequate fire exits4 7 in dereliction of its statutorily
imposed duty, thereby causing deaths and injuries.4" The court
applied the public duty doctrine, expanding its scope to shield state
agencies in addition to local law enforcement. 49 The court used the
same policy justifications it articulated in Braswell, namely, limited
resources and the ominous specter of an overwhelming burden of lia-
bility.5 ° Its legal reasoning was, inter alia, that the Tort Claims Act
incorporated the common law negligence rules, which included the
public duty doctrine. 5'
42. This is in keeping with its historical application in the United States. See
generally Dardis, supra note 16, at 707 (discussing in depth the history of the
doctrine's application and evolution).
43. Braswell, 410 S.E.2d at 902.
44. 495 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1998).
45. 499 S.E.2d 747 (N.C. 1998).
46. Stone, 495 S.E.2d at 713.
47. The problem of inadequate fire exits was only one of many the Department of
Labor would have found had it made an attempt to inspect the plant. Such problems
included locked doors, no markings on exits, no fire alarms, obstructed exits, and no
automatic fire suppression plan. U.S. Department of Labor, Poultry Processing
Industry etool, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/poultry/general-hazards/firesafety.
html (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
48. Stone, 495 S.E.2d at 713.
49. Id. at 716.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 714. Interestingly, the public duty doctrine was not a part of the
common law recognized by North Carolina courts at the time of the passage of the
Tort Claims Act. Id. at 719 (Orr, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 28:271
6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol28/iss2/6
INEVITABLE INEQUITIES
That same year in Hunt, the court held the public duty doctrine
applied when an inspector for the Department of Labor negligently
inspected an amusement ride and concluded its safety restraints were
up to code.5 2 It was later discovered the restraints were not in compli-
ance. 53 As a result of the inspector's failure to discover and enforce the
Department of Labor's standards, an eleven-year-old boy sustained
serious abdominal injuries when the go-kart he was riding in collided
with a pole after the brakes failed.5 4 These two cases left unanswered
the question of where the doctrine would stop, if at all. It was now
clear the court was willing to apply the doctrine to shield state agen-
cies from claims brought under the Tort Claims Act. The question
remained, however, whether the doctrine would be applied to all state
agencies and in all circumstances, or just in cases involving failure to
adequately inspect pursuant to a statutory duty. The cases that fol-
lowed on the heels of Hunt and Stone did little to clear the air.
C. Lovelace v. City of Shelby:5 5 Putting on the Breaks
With the Lovelace case came a change of course in the doctrine's
development. Justice Orr, who dissented in Hunt and Stone, now
found himself in the majority of a different three-judge panel wishing
to stop the ever burgeoning expansion of the public duty doctrine. Jus-
tice Orr reasoned Braswell was limited to its facts in keeping with the
history of the public duty doctrine. 56 The majority conceded the doc-
trine had been expanded to apply to cases against state agencies,5 7 but
it moved quickly to define the limits of that expansion. In dicta, the
majority characterized the extension of the doctrine at the state level
narrowly, as covering cases involving inspections by the state for the
purpose of protecting the general public.51 It also limited the expan-
52. Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 499 S.E.2d 747, 751 (N.C. 1998).
53. Id. at 748.
54. Id.
55. Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 526 S.E.2d 652 (N.C. 2000).
56. Id. at 654 ("The holding in Braswell was specifically limited to the facts in that
case and to the issue of whether the sheriff negligently failed to protect the decedent.
This limitation is consistent with the origin of the public duty doctrine in the United
States in South v. Maryland ex rel. Pottle, 59 U.S. 396 (1855)."); see also Stone, 495
S.E.2d 711, 718 (Orr, J., dissenting) (arguing the public duty doctrine was never
intended to expand outside the limits of local law enforcement cases, and the
expansion of the doctrine beyond its original purpose is not consistent with the
history of the doctrine).
57. Lovelace, 526 S.E.2d at 654.
58. Id.
2006] 277
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sion of the doctrine at the local level to law enforcement,5 9 thereby
preventing its use to protect other subdivisions of local government
like fire departments.6"
D. Viar, Drewry, and Myers: Wrestling with Lovelace
Since Lovelace, the development of the doctrine's application has
proceeded primarily within the court of appeals. This development
culminated in three seminal cases that evidenced the schizophrenia
from which the court suffered concerning this issue: Viar v. North Car-
olina Department of Transportation,6' Drewry v. North Carolina Depart-
ment of Transportation,62 and Myers v. McGrady.6 3 All three of these
cases involved state agencies and the Tort Claims Act.
In Viar, the court of appeals reversed the opinion of the Industrial
Commission, 64 and held the estates of two young girls had failed to
show the Department of Transportation (NCDOT) was negligent.65
The Viar girls were killed in a head-on collision when they skidded
across an Interstate 85 median with no barrier into an oncoming trac-
tor-trailer.66 The court opined the Industrial Commission did not
properly apply the law of negligence.67 Interestingly, it only addressed
the application of the public duty doctrine in dicta, responding to the
dissent's argument that the doctrine barred the claim. 6' The majority
dealt with the issue in passing, with that particular section of the opin-
ion constituting less than a page out of a fourteen-page decision. 69
The opinion pointed out that three past court of appeals cases, when
59. Id. (declining to expand the doctrine at the local level).
60. Id. ("[W]e have never expanded the public duty doctrine to any local
government agencies other than law enforcement departments when they are
exercising their general duty to protect the public .... ").
61. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 590 S.E.2d 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), vacated, 610
S.E.2d 360 (N.C. 2005) (holding the appeal should have been denied by the court of
appeals based on a failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure).
62. Drewry v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 607 S.E.2d 342 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005), disc. rev.
denied, 612 S.E.2d 318 (N.C. 2005).
63. Myers v. McGrady, 613 S.E.2d 334 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005), disc. rev. allowed, 619
S.E.2d 510 (N.C. 2005).
64. The Industrial Commission acts as the trial court pursuant to the Tort Claims
Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (2005).
65. Viar, 590 S.E.2d at 913 (stating the commission's findings were "based upon
erroneous application of the law to the facts, and are not supported by its findings of
fact").
66. Id. at 911.
67. Id. at 915.
68. Id. at 918-19.
69. Id. at 909.
278 [Vol. 28:271
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taken together, clearly established a precedent that "the public duty
doctrine has never been applied to shield the NCDOT from acts of neg-
ligence."7 Additionally, the latest word from the supreme court in
Lovelace was that it had only acknowledged an extension of the doc-
trine to state agencies if the agency was "required by statute to conduct
inspections for the public's general protection .. ". . I' The defendant
appealed, and when the case finally reached the supreme court, it was
vacated on the grounds that the appeal from the Industrial Commis-
sion's decision was improper under the Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure.72 The court never addressed the disagreement at the court of
appeals over whether the public duty doctrine applied to bar the
claim.73
At the same time the supreme court was considering the Viar
appeal, the court of appeals was, once again, faced with the same ques-
tion in Drewry. I This time, the lone dissenter in Viar,75 along with
two different judges, seized the opportunity afforded by the vacating of
the majority's holding in Viar to set a precedent consistent with his
earlier dissent.76 Redirecting the bark of the court of appeals, the new
majority, relying on Stone, held the public duty doctrine applied to
shield state agencies from liability under the Tort Claims Act unless
one of the two previously enumerated exceptions existed.77 This was
an expansion the language of Lovelace did not warrant.
Finally, the court saw the need to clear the air once and for all
with a bright-line rule in keeping with Lovelace. 78 The court accom-
plished this in Myers v. McGrady,79 in which a passenger was killed
when the car in which he was riding struck the rear of a stopped trac-
tor-trailer in a multi-vehicle accident.80 The passenger's estate brought
70. Id. at 919 (citing and summarizing these cases).
71. Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 526 S.E.2d 652, 654 (N.C. 2000) (supporting this
proposition on the basis of Hunt and Stone).
72. Viar, 610 S.E.2d at 361.
73. Id. (focusing exclusively on the plaintiffs violations of appellate procedure
because it felt the appeal should have been dismissed).
74. Drewry v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 607 S.E.2d 342, 346 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005),
disc. rev. denied, 612 S.E.2d 318 (N.C. 2005).
75. Judge Tyson dissented in Viar, 590 S.E.2d at 920.
76. In fact the language the majority used concerning the public duty doctrine is
verbatim that found in the Viar dissent. Drewry, 607 S.E.2d at 346.
77, Id. Though the court did not address this specifically, it can be inferred from
its reliance on Stone.
78. Myers v. McGrady, 613 S.E.2d 334, 339 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005), disc. rev. allowed,
619 S.E.2d 510 (N.C. 2005).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 337.
20061
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an action against the allegedly negligent motorists."' The motorists
then brought third-party claims against the Division of Forest
Resources and a forest ranger alleging he negligently failed to protect
and warn motorists of the danger of reduced visibility caused by
smoke from a forest fire that contributed to the accident.8 2 The court
of appeals, interpreting the supreme court's holding in Lovelace, held
the public duty doctrine did not shield the division from liability
under the Tort Claims Act 3 because "after Lovelace, it appears that the
public duty doctrine [only] applies where plaintiffs allege negligence
through (a) failure of law enforcement to provide protection from the
misconduct of others, and (b) failure of a state's departments or agen-
cies to detect and prevent misconduct of others through improper
inspections."8 4 The court observed that a forest ranger is not a law
enforcement officer and that the allegations of negligence were not
based on any duty of the ranger to detect and prevent the misconduct
of others through inspections.8 5 With this opinion the court of
appeals attempted to solidify the attempts made by the supreme court
in Lovelace to scale back the expansion of the doctrine's use by articu-
lating a clear rule regarding when the doctrine should and should not
be applied. 6
The Myers opinion represents the current state of the law on the
issue of the public duty doctrine. The present rule, although it is dras-
tically scaled back in comparison to Stone, is still fraught with
problems and will lead to inconsistent and irrational results. While
the current rule is clear, questions still remain. Is the law as it stands
now the best policy? By way of the struggle between the two opposing
perspectives, have we arrived at the appropriate synthesis? Is the rule
we now have the rule that will best balance the right of the injured to a
remedy at law with the practical challenges faced by a government
accountable to all? In short, has the court done justice? 7
II. A BETTER WAY
The current rule is not the product of a well reasoned and thor-
oughly thought out decision. Concomitantly, it does not issue from a
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 340.
84. Id. at 339.
85. Id. at 340.
86. Id. at 339.
87. Psalm 82:3 (King James) ("Defend the poor and fatherless: do justice to the
afflicted and needy.").
[Vol. 28:271
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unified court driven by a sincere desire to do right by all parties.
Rather, the current state of the law is one with which neither side can
be happy; it is, in actuality, merely a representation of how far one side
of the debate could expand the rule before the other could stop the
expansion. This result is not in the best interests of the government or
the citizens of North Carolina. It will hurt citizens by denying them
redress for wrongs to which they would be entitled were the tortfeasor
a private individual, 8 and it will hurt the government by turning it
into a shelter for careless and incompetent bureaucracies.8 9
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine
may produce unjust and unacceptable results.90 This was the consid-
eration behind the court's action when it adopted the two exceptions
to the doctrine in Braswell.91 But these exceptions are not enough to
remedy the harms caused by such an austere rule. Instead of this one-
size-fits-all, blanket rule that holds the public duty doctrine always
applies in two particular kinds of cases, the court should adopt a more
workable test. The new rule should recognize how diverse situations
can be, even within the two pigeonholed categories the court of
appeals has enumerated.
The North Carolina Supreme Court should totally abrogate the
public duty doctrine and adopt a traditional negligence standard appli-
cable to all government employees whose acts or omissions cause inju-
ries while in the course of their employment. 92 This new rule should
incorporate factors and considerations aimed at addressing the legiti-
mate concerns of those who support the public duty doctrine's use.93
Under such a common law-based rule, the plaintiff will still be
required to prove that the government owed him or her a duty94 and
that the duty was breached, proximately causing the plaintiffs
injury. 95
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (2005).
89. Swindell, supra note 27, at 250 ("[T]he application of the [public duty]
doctrine promotes incompetence by providing no meaningful incentive for the
governmental entity to provide services of optimal quality.").
90. Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 495 S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. 1998).
91. Braswell v. Braswell, 410 S.E.2d 897, 902 (N.C. 1991).
92. Stone, 495 S.E.2d at 718 (Orr, J., dissenting).
93. For example, consider those concerns raised by the court in Braswell and
repeated in Stone and Hunt, namely, limited resources and the danger of an
overwhelming burden of liability.
94. This is where much of the dissent lies. Even though a statute or ordinance may
define a duty, supporters of the public duty doctrine argue the duty does not extend to
individuals.
95. Kientz v. Carlton, 96 S.E.2d 14, 17 (N.C. 1957).
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A. The Duty of Care
In Stone, the court held even though North Carolina General Stat-
ute Section 95-4 charged the Department of Labor with a duty to
inspect a plant, the duty was for the benefit of the general public and
did not specifically apply to any individual.96 This defeats the first
element of a common law negligence claim.97 The concept of "[a] duty
to all is a duty to none"98 is inherently illogical. If the government has
a duty to the public, it also has a duty to the individuals who make up
the public,99 because the mythical personality the law calls "the pub-
lic" cannot bring suit in order to be made whole or to hold government
accountable. Only individuals can do this.
In addition, the plain language of the Tort Claims Act, authorizing
civil suits against the government, waives the sovereign immunity of
the state "under circumstances where [it], if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the laws of North Caro-
lina."' 00 Under the common law rules of negligence in North Carolina
if a private person is not protected by the public duty doctrine,' 1 then
the government should not be either. As Marshall Shapo stated, "[i]t
would seem curious that the possession of information [by govern-
ment officials] about hazards and the ability to communicate it or to
remedy dangerous conditions should impose liability on a private per-
son but not on a government."' 1 2 In sum, if the legislature charges a
state agency or governmental entity with a duty to do some task for the
protection of the general public, the courts should treat it as just that, a
duty. Dereliction of such a duty should have consequences.
B. Breach of Duty
Breach of duty is the second element of a traditional negligence
claim. 103 This element alone is commonly referred to as "negli-
gence."' 0 4 Whether someone has breached a duty that was owed is
96. Stone, 495 S.E.2d at 716.
97. Brown-Graham, supra note 13, at 2294.
98. Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 499 S.E.2d 747, 753 (N.C. 1998) (Orr, J.,
dissenting).
99. Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132, 138 (Wis. 1976) (holding a
public duty is also a duty owed to individual members of the public).
100. Stone, 495 S.E.2d at 718 (Orr, J., dissenting) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
291(a) (1996)).
101. See Braswell v. Braswell, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (N.C. 1991).
102. MARSHALL S. SHApo, THE DUTY To ACT 81 (1977).
103. KEETON ET AL., supra note 20.
104. Id.
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based on an objective standard. °5 Dean Prosser describes the duty
itself as an "obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to
conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others
against unreasonable risks."'0 6 The breach of that duty is described as
"[a] failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required
.... ,107 "[T]he conduct, to be negligent, must be unreasonable."'0 8
As Prosser notes, in light of the recognizable risk, "negligence is a fail-
ure to do what the reasonable person would do 'under the same or simi-
lar circumstances."'"0 9 This element presents the court with the
opportunity to allow for special considerations affecting a person's
decision to act or refrain from acting in a certain way.110
Reasonableness can only be determined on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account all the variables affecting the person's decision."'
The "reasonableness under the circumstances" standard, as articulated
by Judge Learned Hand in the famous Carrol Towing case, allows the
court to consider the offender's burden of taking adequate precautions
and weigh that burden against the probability the possible harm would
occur, coupled with the severity of the harm that would result, if and
when it did occur." 2 The formula is often represented as follows: if
the burden of taking adequate precautions outweighs the probability of
harm, multiplied by the severity of the possible harm, then the
tortfeasor's acts or omissions were reasonable." 3
105. Id. at 173-74.
106. Id. at 164.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 170.
109. Id. at 175 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (emphasis
added)).
110. SHAPO, supra note 102, at 82 ('Judicial decision in cases of this kind
necessarily must take into account governmental problems in the reconciliation of
competing demands.").
111. KEETON ET AL., supra note 20 ("Yet the infinite variety of situations which may
arise makes it impossible to fix definite rules in advance for all conceivable human
conduct. The utmost that can be done is to devise something in the nature of a
formula, the application of which in each particular case must be left to the jury, or to
the court.") (emphasis added).
112. United States v. Carrol Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
113. ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 17 (3d ed. 1990). This theory is
widely accepted but has been roundly criticized as a purely economic approach to
negligence. See, e.g., Patrick F. Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A
Normative Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REV.
465, 468-69 (1978).
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C. Limited Resources
The court should modify the first factor in the Hand formula in
cases where the government is the defendant to address any concerns
about limited resources 1 4 and excessive liability. The factor could be
modified by the court's consideration of the following: 1) whether any
actual limitation on resources existed at all, 2) the extent of the limita-
tion placed on the particular governmental entity's resources, and 3)
whether the limitation was one that should justify the government's
allegedly negligent act or omission. These considerations should be
used when determining the government's burden of taking adequate
precautions.' l5  Using this modified Hand formula to determine
whether the defendant's act or omission was reasonable is sufficient to
ensure a just result and to prevent the discretionary freedom of the
governmental entity from being hampered unnecessarily.116
For example, suppose on the day Mrs. Braswell died at the hands
of her husband, the sheriff knew Mr. Braswell had specifically
threatened to take her life that day during her commute and the sher-
iff, having full knowledge of the volatility of the situation, 17 assigned
no officers to see her safely to and from work or even to check on her.
Suppose also the sheriff had his entire force on security duty at a
peaceful gathering of a pacifist group. In addition, assume the sheriff
had dealt with this group and its activities on prior occasions without
incident and that the sheriff had no reason to believe this occasion
would be any different. Even so, on the day in question, the sheriff
simply did not take the threat seriously, and since the perpetrator was
an employee and a friend, he did not want to be seen as an intrusive,
meddling boss. As a result, the sheriff took a chance nothing bad
would happen.
114. SHAPO, supra note 102, at 82.
115. Id. at 82-83 ("In any event, whichever standard of reasonableness is selected, it
should be applied to government and citizens alike, with courts simply factoring in the
extra burdens that government may face because of multifarious demands on their
police resources. It should be added that when the issue involves an ability to exercise
power that is crucial for personal safety, the basic level of obligation of governments
should tend to be heightened, providing an appropriate counterpart to the relaxation
of their duties in particular cases to account for their peculiar burdens.").
116. The argument often leveled by proponents of the public duty doctrine is that
the limited nature of resources available to governmental entities requires them to
make discretionary decisions about the apportionment of those resources and that
those discretionary decisions concerning the apportionment of resources should not
be influenced by the looming threat of litigation, so the officials can use their best
judgment without fear of excessive liability. Swindell, supra note 27, at 250-51.
117. Braswell v. Braswell, 410 S.E.2d 897, 900 (N.C. 1991).
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Clearly this is reckless and unreasonable behavior that, had this
been an individual citizen, would have likely led to a civil remedy for
the injury suffered due to the defendant's negligence."i 8 In this hypo-
thetical situation, no actual limitation on the sheriff's resources
existed, and thus, no justifiable reason for the nonfeasance that
culminated in such a tragedy existed. Nevertheless, since the govern-
ment is the one allegedly at fault, the public duty doctrine, premised
upon limited resources, would relieve the sheriff of his duty to the
plaintiff and, consequently, of all liability." 9 This is in spite of the fact
the sheriff had specific knowledge concerning the threat to this victim
that made his actions manifestly unreasonable.' 20 In this situation,
the existence of the "special relationship" and the "special duty" excep-
tions are ineffective "to prevent inevitable inequities to certain individ-
uals."'' Under the current rule, in a case such as this, manifest
negligence on the part of law enforcement would be shielded, and no
remedy would be available for those injured thereby.' 2 2
When situations like this arise, such unreasonable behavior
should give rise to a cause of action, so the victim may be made whole
again "'23 and the government held accountable for unjustifiable and
unreasonable acts or omissions. Reason requires that when the
resource restrictions placed on the government have no bearing what-
soever on the government's actions or failures to act, the government
should not be allowed to escape liability. Traditional negligence stan-
dards coupled with the modifications mentioned earlier would allow
judges to take into consideration the lack of limitations on resources
in cases like this. The proposed rule would also allow citizens to hold
government accountable while, at the same time, protecting govern-
ment when it exercises due care to do the best job possible to protect
the public with the resources made available to it. Had the sheriff
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291(a) (2005) ("The Industrial Commission shall
determine whether or not each individual claim arose as a result of the negligence of
any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting within the
scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority, under circumstances
where the State of North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the laws of North Carolina.") (emphasis added).
119. Braswell, 410 S.E.2d at 901-02.
120. This is a question of foreseeability. This murder was reasonably foreseeable
because of what the sheriff knew about the threats and the perceived risk of harm in
each of the situations competing for his attention.
121. Braswell, 410 S.E.2d at 902.
122. Braswell, 410 S.E.2d 897.
123. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 1 (discussing the socio-economic purpose
and function of tort law).
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acted as a reasonably prudent person in his position and in light of his
available resources, then there would exist no breach of the duty
incumbent upon him by virtue of his position as sheriff and, therefore,
no liability.
Such a flexible standard is necessary in order to deal in a fair and
just way with the challenges faced by local governments in regard to
the limited resources afforded them. The following example illustrates
why. Suppose two small towns have the same population base. This
does not necessarily mean they will have a constituency comprising
people with similar income levels, property of the same value, a similar
tax base, or an equal amount of state and federal funding. Therefore,
the local law enforcement and the local government in these two towns
may be radically divergent in comparison to one another in regard to
available resources and ability to meet certain risks to the public. It is
very possible one town may have significantly more resources at its
disposal to fight crime. Under the current state of the law, the public
duty doctrine will hold both of these municipalities to the same stan-
dard. 124 Even though one has more than adequate resources to deal
with the risk of harm and the other does not, the public duty doctrine
declares neither is accountable for failing to use them to prevent harm
to the public, even if it would have been reasonable in light of all the
circumstances and even if it amounted to willful and wanton disre-
gard. 125 Such inequities will disappear with the death of the public
duty doctrine if, in its place, the court adopts a rule distinguishing
between cases involving actual limitations on resources and those
where resource limitations are nothing more than pretextual.
Society does not expect perfection from government and law
enforcement, but it does expect due diligence to be given and reasona-
ble steps to be taken to protect the public and individuals when it is
reasonable and necessary in light of the circumstances. This is not too
much to ask of government. But, to reach this goal, the rules determin-
ing when government will be held liable need to be flexible enough to
conform to the special challenges, or lack thereof, that different enti-
124. The courts' current rule applies, irrespective of actual resources, to every
governmental entity based on the false premise that every entity's resources are
limited. Myers v. McGrady, 613 S.E.2d 334 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005), disc. rev. allowed,
619 S.E.2d 510 (N.C. 2005).
125. See Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 495 S.E.2d 711, 718-19 (N.C. 1998) (Orr, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that under the common law in place before the court's
application of the public duty doctrine the state was shielded from liability under
sovereign immunity for all torts, even "wanton" or "reckless" acts; going on to say that
the majority has simply reinstated this scheme by adopting the public duty doctrine,
rendering the Tort Claims Act "virtually obsolete").
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ties of government face, so each entity can be judged on the basis of its
own unique circumstances.
D. Laws Haphazardly Enforced Versus No Laws126
In Stone, the court noted, "[The] Plaintiffs could not easily escape
the plant or the fire because the exits in the plant were unmarked,
blocked, and inaccessible," and "[a]fter the fire, the [department] con-
ducted their first and only inspection in the plant's eleven-year history
of operation."'127 The court opined, "[A] government ought to be free
to enact laws for the public protection without thereby exposing its sup-
porting taxpayers ... to liability for failures or omissions in its attempt
to enforce them. It is better to have such laws, even haphazardly
enforced, than not to have them at all.' '1
28
Such an argument is haphazard in itself. The logical extension of
such reasoning is that the government, by law, can charge certain of its
officers and employees with duties to inspect for the protection of the
general public, but, in reality, no duty exists to carry it out. In Stone,
no inspection was performed until it was too late, 129 and no one was
accountable for the failure to fulfill that duty. 3 ' So, in essence, the
government is saying to its officers and employees, "You have a duty
(i.e., responsibility or obligation) to protect the public, but, if you do
not keep that charge, there will be no consequences." If there are no
consequences for negligent or incompetent discharge of one's statu-
tory duties, there is no duty; performance becomes optional. From a
policy standpoint this is unacceptable because it turns the govern-
ment, which many depend on to protect them from certain harms, into
a haven for incompetent, irresponsible, and ineffective
bureaucracies. 13'
When laws are not present that purport to protect the public from
certain harms, citizens are responsible for their own welfare and can-
not charge the government with responsibility for misfortune. How-
ever, when laws are made that place a duty upon the government to
perform certain protective services for citizens they induce reliance
and dependence upon the government in the psyche of the citi-
126. Id. at 716.
127. Stone, 495 S.E.2d at 713.
128. Id. at 716 (quoting Grogan v. Kentucky, 577 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ky. 1979)).
129. Id. at 713.
130. Id. (holding the public duty doctrine shielded the agency from liability for the
resulting deaths and injuries).
131. See RABIN, supra note 113, at 16 (arguing private rights of action against the
government can be a means of safety regulation).
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zenry. 132 This reliance creates a dynamic in which the people choose
not to take personal responsibility for their own safety because the
government has created in their minds a false sense of security by
promising to do it for them. If the government then fails to do what it
said it would do, the end result is no one looking out for the safety of
those to whom the government owed the duty. The government is not
compelled to place such responsibilities on itself, but, when it does, it
should be required to perform competently that which it has obligated
itself to do. When no limitation on the government's resources exists,
but ample governmental negligence is present, the public duty doc-
trine only serves to shelter haphazard enforcement of the law.133
The proposed modified Hand formula will hold the government to
a higher standard than does the public duty doctrine without unduly
subjecting it to excessive litigation. Even if such a rule does bring
increased exposure to liability, the government will have nothing to
fear so long as it does its duty, not to prevent harm in every circum-
stance, but rather, to take steps reasonable under the circumstances to
prevent that harm. This is all the public asks.
E. The Burden of Liability
Those who oppose abrogation of the public duty doctrine always
point to the specter of a crippling burden of liability that will ensue if
individuals are allowed to sue the government for negligence.' 34 These
concerns are inflated and unfounded 135 for two reasons. First, the leg-
islature has had ample opportunity to debate and consider this factor,
and after doing so, the Tort Claims Act and other statutes subjecting
the government to suit by its citizens were nevertheless passed. AsJus-
tice Orr pointed out in his dissent from the Stone decision, had the
legislature intended to continue to shield the government from the bur-
den of litigation it could have left the law as it was, 1 3 6 however, it did
not. From this action, it is evident the legislature intended for the state
to be liable in all situations where the private individual would be, 137
and for the state's statutory duties to the public to be duties to individ-
132. SHAPO, supra note 102, at 81 ("The key to duty ... resides in the dependence of
the unknown plaintiff .... ") (emphasis added).
133. See Stone, 495 S.E.2d at 716 (citing Grogan v. Kentucky, 577 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ky.
1979)).
134. See, e.g., id. at 717; Braswell v. Braswell, 410 S.E.2d 897, 902 (N.C. 1991).
135. The effects of excessive liability of governments are speculative at best. Dardis,
supra note 16, at 721.
136. Stone, 495 S.E.2d at 719 (Orr, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
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uals. 138 Aside from this, even if it could be proved the waiver of immu-
nity would bankrupt the state, it is not the job of the courts to usurp
the power of the legislature by supplanting the body's judgment with
its own. Second, under a traditional negligence scheme of liability
with the modification to the reasonableness standard proposed, the
instances in which the state has suit filed against it may be increased,
but the instances that the state is actually held liable will not rise to
the astronomical levels predicted by the gainsayers. This is due to the
fact the court will be allowed to consider the resources the government
actually had available to meet the risk it failed to prevent, in order to
determine whether negligence was present. In this process, those
claims where the government entity's acts or omissions are justified
because of such limitations will not likely see success.
CONCLUSION
The public duty doctrine was not a part of North Carolina com-
mon law in 1951 when the legislature decided to waive the state's sov-
ereign immunity by passing the Tort Claims Act, and it was not applied
until 1991.139 Yet, part of the justification for its adoption is the argu-
ment that the legislature incorporated the common law, which
included the doctrine, when it passed the Tort Claims Act. 140 Had the
legislature wished to incorporate such a common law principle, it
could have specifically stated such. Since it was not in use in North
Carolina at the time, the public duty doctrine simply could not have
been in the mind of the legislature when it waived the state's sovereign
immunity. Effectively, this doctrine emasculates the legislature's
action in passing statutes allowing private individuals recourse against
the government, and its application is therefore in direct contravention
of the intent of the legislature.14 '
The Supreme Court of North Carolina should totally abrogate the
public duty doctrine in deference to the will of the legislature. Disdain
for the doctrine is spreading, with numerous states having already
taken this step. 1 4 2 Instead, the traditional rules of negligence should
138. See, e.g., Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1976) (holding a
public duty is also a duty owed to individual members of the public).
139. See Braswell, 410 S.E.2d 897.
140. Stone, 495 S.E.2d at 715.
141. Id. at 719 (Orr, J., dissenting).
142. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d
597 (Ariz. 1982); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986); Commercial Carrier
Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); Brennen v. City of Eugene,
591 P.2d 719 (Or. 1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1976).
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govern whether the governmental entity in question should be held
liable for an alleged wrong. In order to address the challenges faced by
government because of limited resources, the question whether the
state breached its duty through unreasonable acts or omissions should
include considerations geared toward the unique situation in which
governmental officers and entities find themselves. In this way the
courts can, in a more just and consistent way, allow recovery when the
circumstances warrant, while also protecting the government from
suits that will unnecessarily hamper its work. If the legislature is of
the opinion that liability needs to be further limited, it may do so
through the democratic process.
G. Braxton Price
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